

**INTELLIGENCE TRAINING FOR STABILITY AND  
SUPPORT OPERATIONS--CAN THE MILITARY  
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ADVANCE COURSE DO  
BETTER?**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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## ABSTRACT

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Futurists depict a world dominated by increased ethnically based transnational threats using asymmetric tactics to engage U.S. forces. These type operations are categorized under the rubric of Stability and Support Operations (SASO).

Currently our training strategy is to remain ready for Major Regional Conflict (MRC) and prepare for SASO on a case by case basis. This monograph examines the intelligence skills required to operate in a SASO environment and then evaluates how well the Military Intelligence Advanced Course (MIOAC) prepares students for SASO challenges.

The monograph methodology is to define the intelligence skills required for SASO and validate the proposed skill set against doctrine and Mission Essential Task Lists for Army Intelligence XXI. Following definition of the skills a review of recent SASO operations to include; Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia document the quality of intelligence officer performance in SASO operational environments. MIOAC is then reviewed for how well it addresses operational shortfalls based on standards correlated to the intelligence skill set identified earlier.


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
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
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## Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War the US Armed Forces are no longer primarily focused on a conflict between two robust conventional military forces. In recent years Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) have constituted the bulk of our engagements. Of the eighty wars since 1945 only 28 have fit the traditional mold of industrial age conflict between the armies of two or more nation states.<sup>1</sup>

Conventional military operations require a doctrinal context to assess information and forecast enemy actions. SASO and MOOTW (henceforth referred to simply as SASO) operations also require a cultural context to anticipate potential enemy actions. As a result, traditionally non-military areas such as economics, crime, and local politics increasingly impinge on military operations.<sup>2</sup>

While technology evolves rapidly, the capacity of humans using technology does not. Therefore, it is critical that we teach our junior officers to sort and fuse information. This knowledge will allow them to operate, manage and lead effectively in the threat environment of the twenty-first century.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the amount of information required to fight and maintain an army increased. The staff evolved as a means to organize information in order to think about, plan for, and direct warfighting.<sup>3</sup>

In the intelligence area, disaggregating, processing, fusing, and analyzing became organized by intelligence disciplines (Signals Intelligence = SIGINT, Human Intelligence = HUMINT Imagery Intelligence = IMINT) and by the level of information needed by

the supported commander (tactical or operational versus strategic intelligence officers and organizations). As a result, training of all-source intelligence leaders focused on creating soldiers who were able to assemble the pieces of information from the various “INTs”, then focus them on the level of the supported commander and fuse them into a coherent whole.<sup>4</sup>

As we have discovered in our recent SASO operations, the distinction between tactical, operational and the strategic levels of war are often flattened. As a result, national agencies have developed standard procedures to provide support packages to tactical units involved in SASO operations.<sup>5</sup> Simultaneously, the exponential growth of information technology threatens to overwhelm staffs. Thus, the intelligence staff armed with a discrete process and training, faces a future threat that is more ambiguous.

Our army has a structured process for dealing with changing conditions - it is the Doctrine, Training, Leadership, Organization, Material, Soldiers and Experimentation (DTLOMS-E) methodology developed by TRADOC.<sup>6</sup> This paper will focus on the Training and embedded education aspect of the TRADOC model as a means to address the coming ambiguity.

While the world has become more complex, new technologies provide an opportunity to create new training methods. The Internet and cheapening video technologies provides the prospect of increased “distance learning,” and increasingly sophisticated simulations may provide opportunity for “synthetic experience” in complex environments.

Training of junior intelligence officers is critical if future intelligence organizations are to cope with future threats. This paper is limited to examining the training of captains. Unlike lieutenants, captains have a basic understanding of how the Army works (are no longer apprentices) and are closest to the lieutenants, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted soldiers doing the first order analytic work. At Divisions and Corps they translate the commander's information requirements as delineated by the G2 into mission tasking for intelligence fusion analysts. They are the first to note key but unanticipated factors associated with ambiguous situations. They are charged with training intelligence soldiers on a daily basis. Finally, at the battalion and brigade level captains are generally the senior intelligence officers on the staff.

There are many in the Army today who believe our current training regimen is "about right." We remain ready for Major Regional Conflict (MRC) and prepare for SASO on a case by case basis.<sup>7</sup> These leaders argue that the myriad of potential conflicts is so large that we cannot anticipate them and the safest course is to prepare to fight the worst case and adjust as required to the rest. They may be right. However, if we believe as an Army that the worst case is the least likely, it is prudent to examine the intelligence skills required of our all source leaders to provide succinct, timely and coherent enemy assessments in the most likely and most ambiguous contingencies.

To determine whether the current training program is sufficient for the threats of the twenty-first century it is first necessary to identify the challenges of intelligence fusion in ambiguous environments. The first step is to have a common understanding of the character of future threats. Once the threats have been characterized, the kinds of data

analysts and leaders need to know to assess future threat capabilities can be identified. Additionally, the flattening of the tactical-operational-strategic levels of war influences the analytical skills and training required of junior intelligence officers. There are a plethora of types of information associated with the many threats we may encounter. It is necessary to distinguish between that type of information a leader/analyst must master and that type of information others can be relied on to master. Finally, reliance on others to provide critical data in ambiguous situations implies integration skills that warrant examination.

Once the critical skills required are identified it is possible to assess how well the current schoolhouse (Ft. Huachuca) training prepares captains to perform these tasks. Central to this examination are the curriculum and training objectives of the Military Intelligence Officer Advance Course (MIOAC). Additionally, the experiences and after-action reviews (AARs) of recent SASO operations provide insight into how well intelligence analysts and leaders have performed in ambiguous situations.

The comparison of critical tasks to curriculum and training objectives should reveal areas for improvement or wholesale revision of the current training program. All proposed changes must be made in the context of improving our ability to conduct intelligence in SASO without sacrificing our ability to perform intelligence tasks associated with MRC operations. The ambiguous threat environment of the future may require a radical shift in the way intelligence officers are trained. Ideas which this paper addresses are: curriculum modification, the role of simulations, and an examination of when and for what types of training, officers go to school.

In summation, this paper examines the characteristics of our most likely future threats and how those threats affect the knowledge base required of junior (captain) Military Intelligence officers. This paper then examines whether the current schoolhouse based training program trains captains in the skills they will require. This examination is based on both standards developed in the body of the paper as well as a survey of lessons learned from recent SASO operations. In cases where it is demonstrated that the current level of training is inadequate recommendations for improvement are made.

### **Part I - Future Threat Based Training Requirement**

In the broad sense intelligence personnel will continue to make sense out of data and information. Primarily intelligence personnel will answer "what does the information mean" ...recognizing possible outcomes...predicting order and likelihood of these possibilities happening

BG Hall 'End of September Stray Voltage' - 27 Sept. 1998 <sup>8</sup>

To understand the nature of future threats, it is necessary to have a common vision of the future environment. The Army recently formed the Intelligence XXI Study Panel under the tutelage of BG Hall, who was quoted above. This panel was charged with looking to the future, identifying the threat, and making recommendations on how to adjust Army intelligence to prepare for that future threat. The author participated in some of the study's work.

The study's foundation was built on a threat white paper characterizing the future world. The white paper laid out the following four dominant trends for the future:<sup>9</sup>

1. Demographics - rich states will continue to age and have a population decline, poor states will grow and remain predominately young. Both rich and poor states will increasingly urbanize. This will result in three distinct worlds: advanced societies (< 1 billion people), developing states (5-6 billion people) and chaotic states (1-2 billion people).

2. Economics - a widening of the gap between rich and poor states will lead to increased interstate migrations and potential ethnic conflict.

3. Information - a continued explosion of information processing and transmission capability will result in cheap and ubiquitous access to information.

4. Technology- rapid development of new technologies with military application will take place primarily among civilian research and development. The result will be that military technology will lag commercial development.

This same view of the future is articulated in Joint Vision 2010 and summarized as follows: "In sum, the U.S. must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology and challenging us at varying levels of intensity."<sup>10</sup>

A survey of the literature addressing the shape of future conflict reveals the following consistent themes:

1. Increased transnational threats - criminal cartels, terrorists, etc.<sup>11</sup>
2. Increased ethnically- based conflict.<sup>12</sup>
3. Decreased recognition for the laws of war.<sup>13</sup>

4. Increased use of asymmetric tactics by US opponents - these include use of information operations, as well as increased ability of the enemy to learn and adapt.<sup>14,15,16,17</sup>

5. Greater reliance on our ability to exploit tactical to national intelligence capabilities and databases.<sup>18</sup>

6. Decreased ability to decipher enemy intent based on Western interpretation of enemy interests.<sup>19</sup>

7. Continued sensitivity of the US to losses and resultant strategy of killing U.S. soldiers as key element of asymmetric warfare.<sup>20</sup>

In summary, the threat may be characterized as ethnically- based, transnational, learning and adaptive, unconstrained by conventional ethics or thought processes and predisposed to attack American interests. Clearly, this poses a dangerous and ambiguous situation under which to commit American soldiers.

Nonetheless soldiers will be committed to such operations. Tactical commanders and their S-2s will be the first line of analytical defense in these future wars. As stated by LTC Daniel Bolger in Savage Peace - Americans at War in the 1990s

The nature of OOTW, strategy, operations and tactics have an unnerving tendency to neck down to about the level of lieutenant colonels or colonels...In the three big post-Gulf War operations (Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia) ...key decisions fell to men with a lot to do, men with twenty years experience or less, men without a staff.<sup>21</sup>

Given the nature of the threat described above, the types of information S-2s need to be able to navigate to support their commanders may be put into five general groupings. First and foremost remains *Military Capabilities*. Even though the weapon of

choice may change from a T-80 tank to a rifle it remains a basic tenet of professional competence that the S-2 know the enemies *military capabilities* within the constraints of local weather and terrain.

The intelligence briefing format for major regional conflict has a placeholder for biographic information about the opposing enemy commander. However, as an example, it was not necessary to know the politics, history or prejudices of the 8th Combined Arms Army (8th CAA) commander to defeat him. Clearly SASO is different in this regard. Unlike the 8th CAA whose objectives, doctrine and SOPs were easily identifiable, the SASO enemy is more a product of the personality of the leader then the doctrine of the Army. An understanding of the leader requires an understanding of the roots of the conflict from his or her perspective. This requires knowledge of the local history and historical myths, an appreciation for the inter-relationships among the local actors in the political, social and economic communities and some basic understanding of the psychology of the individuals to include religious or ideological beliefs. These criteria may be called *Socio-Biographic*.

As the strategic and operational levels of war collapse on the tactical level, the S-2 must know how to navigate among the intelligence organizations operating at each level. This will be referred to as *Parallel Effort Optimization*. There is the long-standing apocryphal tale in the intelligence community of “false separate-source confirmation.” It goes like this: Imagery Intelligence detects the presence of elements of the 56th Tank Battalion of the 8th CAA in the 5th CAA’s sector of operations. SIGINT simultaneously intercepts communications from the 56th Tank Battalion in 5th CAAs sector and

HUMINT processes a report from an IPW of the 56th Tank Battalion found in the 5th CAA's sector. Each of the separated "INT" stovepipes reports evidence of "elements of the 8th CAA committed in the 5th CAA's area." The fused product reaches the conclusion, based on what appears to be three separate sources, that the 5th CAA has been committed in the 8th CAA's sector, when in fact the lead company of the 56th Tank Battalion is merely lost.<sup>22</sup>

This type of error is exacerbated by distance from the fight. The unit in front of the lost company knew there was not enough evidence to reach such a conclusion. Another element is stovepiped collection. The ultimate example of which is our current national agencies. Finally, analysts, particularly those far from the action, want to make a contribution by making an assessment.

Today's situation in Bosnia reveals elements of the same syndrome. The competing assessments of when the Train and Equip program should be terminated provides an example. Task Force Eagle in Bosnia has one assessment of when the Train and Equip program will make the Croatians military peer competitors to the Serbs. The 66th MI Group in Germany has a different assessment, and the Joint Analysis Center in England has a third.<sup>23</sup> To a large degree their perspectives reflect where they sit and who they work for. We must prepare our junior officers for this reality. It is critical that tactical analysts have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the supporting national and operational level intelligence centers coupled with the ability to ask the right questions when such assessments are provided.


Another aspect of *Parallel Effort Optimization* is the leverage of non-DOD agencies. SASO is characterized by a large number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) on the battlefield. These include agencies such as the International Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, etc. Although these agencies do not conduct intelligence activities, they do have a great sense for the atmosphere among the populace. It is important that our training expose officers to these agencies and begin early to build respect for their capabilities and contributions.

Finally, it is critical that intelligence professionals at all levels communicate the critical details of their analyzed product to their supported commander. As Richard Friedman points out in his article on “Open Source Intelligence”, “Research and analysis are at the core of intelligence...facts are without meaning...senior [leaders still] want timely, accurate intelligence...”.<sup>24</sup> This area will be called *Presentation*.

Embedded across all four of these functional areas is a fifth, *Organic Analysis and Fusion*. This is the ability to analyze and synthesize across the other four areas.

In sum there are five functional areas that form the criteria for research into the effectiveness of MIOAC to prepare captains to conduct intelligence fusion, in future SASO operational environments. These areas are illustrated below:

# Functional Area Paradigm



Having identified the five functional areas for intelligence training, it is important to ensure that these cover the spectrum of conflict to include MRC. Part of the groundwork upon which the Intelligence XXI study was built was a “Mission Essential Task List (METL): [for] Army Intelligence 2010.” These METL tasks addressed both SASO and MRC requirements.<sup>25</sup> The 19 METL tasks are cross-walked to the five functional areas in the matrix below.

METL TASKS	<i>Presentation</i>	<i>Parallel Effort Optimization</i>	<i>Organic Analysis Fusion</i>	<i>Socio-Biographic</i>	<i>Military Capabilities</i>
Articulate requirements	X	X	X		
Collect Info	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Cross-cue sensors		X			
Automate, manipulate data	X		X		
Share Info	X	X			
Provide Intelligence support to Targeting				X	X
Develop knowledge of METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time - Troops, Civilians)				X	X
Seek and Create synergy		X	X		
Adapt to change			X	X	
Provide Intelligence support to Information Operations		X		X	
Shape the Future	X		X		
Find foe's center of Gravity (COG)				X	X
Protect friendly centers of gravity				X	X
Visualize Information and Intelligence	X				
Think: What does the collected info mean?	X	X	X	X	X
Predict activities of foes			X		X
Suppress enemy activities				X	X
Leverage capabilities of national intelligence community		X			
Plan, conduct force protection operations		X	X	X	X

**Table 1 - Army XXI Intelligence METL - Functional Area X-Walk**

A roll-up of the 19 METL tasks cross-walked against the five training criteria reveals several things. In depth training and education in the five functional areas will prepare MI Captains to conduct quality analysis and fusion in all environments from SASO through MRC. This construct will not address the particulars of actual collection as that is a stovepiped activity. Note, the most frequently cited criterion is *Socio-Biographic* which is cited nine times. It is critical that MIAOC prepare leaders to operate in this arena. Both *Military Capability* and *Parallel Effort Optimization* are cited eight

times. While *Presentation*, though important, is only cited six times and is the area where we can assume the most risk.

Doctrine provides a final cross check of the proposed paradigm. The current Army FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) addresses IPB for Operations Other Than War (OOTW). In Chapter Six of FM 34-130 there are ten types of operations. An examination of the doctrine for IPB in support of each of these operations reveals that every functional area except for *Presentation* is addressed in the doctrine. Instead of *Presentation* there is some general guidance such as: prepare “peace violation templates” or “drug activity support templates.” There are however, no examples of what these might look like. The matrix below cross-walks the ten OOTW operations, the phases of IPB and where *Military Capability* (MC), *Socio-Biographic* (SB), *Parallel Effort Optimization* (PE) and *Organic Analysis and Fusion*(OA) are addressed.<sup>27</sup>

Type Operations	Define Battlefield Environment	Define Battlefield Effects	Evaluate Threat	Determine Threat Courses of Action
Human Assistance and Disaster relief	MC PE	SB PE	MC	MC OA
Support to Counterdrug Operations	MC SB	SB	SB MC	MC OA
Combat Terrorism	MC SB	SB	SB MC	MC OA
Show Of force	MC PE SB	SB	MC SB OA	MC SB OA
Attacks and Raids	MC	MC	MC	SB OA
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations	PE SB	SB	MC	SB OA
Peace Enforcement	SB	SB	MC SB	MC SB OA
Support to insurgency & counter insurgency	SB MC	SB	SB MC	MC SB OA PE
Support to Peacekeeping	MC SB	SB PE	MC	OA
Support to domestic Civil Authorities	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table 2 - FM 34-130 & Training Criteria X-walk

The table above reveals *Military Capability* and *Socio-Biographic* analyses are addressed twice during the IPB process for almost every operation. In every process

*Organic Analysis* comes to the forefront during the determination of threat courses of action. *Parallel Effort Optimization* is addressed in most, but not all OOTW operations. It is primarily focused on NGOs vice parallel intelligence agency collection and processing.

Having vetted the proposed criteria against both the Intelligence XXI METL and IPB doctrine it is now appropriate to determine how to evaluate the quality of present-day training against the criteria.

First, a survey of recent SASO lessons learned will reveal those areas where training has been weak in the past. In reviewing operational AARs, performances in the five areas are embedded in comments on IPB (*Military Capabilities, Socio-Biographic* and *Organic Analysis and Fusion, Presentation* products) and CMD (*Parallel Effort Optimization*).

Having identified operational evidence of strengths and weaknesses it is appropriate to examine the MIOAC curriculum. Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia AARs reflect the quality of the MIOAC of previous years but do not provide insights into the current or recent curriculum. An examination of the current curriculum will show whether the lessons learned from recent SASO operations are being addressed. Standards are required to judge the performance of the curriculum in training against the five functional areas. Assessment of the quality of the current training program results from review of how well the curriculum addresses the shortfalls in the performance of intelligence soldiers in recent operations

Since the *Socio-Biographic* area is the most critical based on our analysis, it is the standard that needs to be addressed first. This category of knowledge poses a challenge.

Clearly no training program can possibly anticipate the myriad of places in which soldiers may be called to serve. Thus any proposed training standard cannot focus on the specifics of *Socio-Biographic* information but rather must focus on training skills. Therefore it is not realistic to hope to create a “master” *Socio-Biographic* expert at the junior officer level. It is clearly necessary to create an officer who knows how to ask the right questions and can both analyze (break down into components) and synthesize (fuse into a holistic view) the specifics based on the mission.

As addressed earlier in describing future threats, *Socio-Biographic* knowledge requires detailed understanding of the culture and history of a nation as well as the key personalities, effecting the local situation.

There are two general approaches to teaching the skills required to be *Socio-Biographic* “smart.” The first would include a vast array of specific classes on areas that provide the background to navigate *Socio-Biographic* waters. These include anthropological classes on the nature of society, survey classes on economic political, and religious systems, psychology classes on how people are motivated etc. This approach is both too time consuming (MIOAC is about six months long) and, although they expose the student to a wide range of facts, they are generally not interactive.

The second method for teaching an appreciation of the *Socio-Biographic* factors is the case study. The case study requires that students delve into the various details of *Socio-Biographic* information for a specific area. Students learn and understand the key factors impinging on that area and they forecast threat activity or recommend ways to influence the threat. The endstate is for the captain to know how to ask better questions

about the various *Socio-Biographic* factors that come to play in a given situation.

Considering the time available and the ability to build some real-world experience the case study is clearly the preferable of the two methods for training in this area.

In building a training evaluation matrix the first standard is: (1) - What is the quality of the SASO-related case studies included in the training?

The second criteria needing standards identification is *Parallel Effort Optimization*. There are two general areas where higher, lower and equal (i.e., a brigade S-2 talking to his counterpart in another brigade) intelligence agencies can assist an S-2. The first area is collection, and the second is production. There is a general feeling that tactical collection management is broken.<sup>28</sup> This is in large part because there are a plethora of agencies whose collection capabilities are constantly evolving.<sup>29</sup> In recent years the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) concept has come to the fore. This is because as tactical-operational-strategic levels of war flatten, higher to lower intelligence support becomes more critical and the inability of S-2s and G-2s to know and understand the changing capabilities of national agencies requires on-site liaison. Additionally, the primacy of HUMINT in SASO operations further complicates the collection effort. HUMINT operations are extremely sensitive because of the danger incurred to collectors. It is very difficult, therefore, for tactical intelligence organizations to really know the capabilities of supporting higher echelon HUMINT without risking compromise of the source. A key aspect of *Parallel Effort Optimization* becomes the capabilities and uses of NIST teams.

The analyticai portion of the paradigm laid out earlier reflects the second area of *Parallel Effort Optimization*, namely production which is analysis and fusion focused. This aspect is critical to building a quality leader of all-source analysts in their fusion effort. Focus of the *Parallel Effort Optimization* criteria will be on accessing and integrating analytical products and optimizing collection systems.

It is critical that we train leaders to make better use of parallel products. There exists within the tactical community, a common belief that assessments from higher organizations lack the understanding of the situation that those closest to the situation have. In some cases as was pointed out in an earlier illustration this is true. In many cases it is false. In SASO operations as in MRC operations the tactical unit generally knows better than anyone what is happening RIGHT NOW! Because the unit is engaged in the “right now” there is little time to think. Ultimately, quality analysis requires an understanding of the situation, to include key players, a set of quality assumptions about the future, and time to think.

Those not embroiled in the action often have good (if not better) information about the players. Frequently analysts in “sanctuary” have had time to research key aspects of the situation. Sometimes analysts have special training, and may have the Masters in the culture of Phalangestan that the tactical analyst does not. Clearly they have more time to think. The disconnect between their assessment and that of the engaged unit is frequently a result of different set of assumptions.

We must teach our analysts two things. The first is the importance of parallel agency production and the second is how to discuss it intelligently when assessments are

at variance with the facts or simply “do not make sense.” Ultimately this boils down to how to think critically. Key to any discussion of how to think critically is the elimination of the lecture method of learning. Critical thinking requires examination of ones' beliefs as well as an examination of the underlying assumptions of that being analyzed. It is founded in dialogue.

The next two standards by which to measure the quality of training are: (2) How much of the training is dialogue versus lecture and (3) How much exposure do students get to national level collection system capabilities and management?

The next area to examine is *Military Capabilities*. The understanding of *military capabilities* and their impact on enemy courses of action have been the bread and butter of intelligence training. After learning the mechanics of tracking order of battle, performing IPB, and preparing an assessment, the key feature of learning the intricacy of *military capabilities* assessment has been the simulation wargame. The benefits of the simulation wargame are so apparent that they serve as a cornerstone of our training program for Division and Corps commanders and their staffs. The simulation wargame allows S-2s and their commanders to conduct *organic analysis and fusion* based on the situation, terrain and threat military capabilities. The results of that analysis are tested by the success of the selected course of action.

For SASO operations the simulation wargame needs to remain the centerpiece for training. Unlike conventional operations, where the databases are dominated by large numbers of limited feature icons, the SASO simulation will require fewer icons with many more individualized capabilities. It is not clear that technology supports this

requirement. The purpose of this paper is not to design a SASO simulation. However, it is important that some form of simulation be included in properly training our officers to go into a SASO environment. It is possible that this simulation can be merged with the interactive case study addressed earlier. Nevertheless, the standard for this criterion is: (4) The use of simulations for both MRC and SASO environments as part of the training program.

Next it is appropriate to look at the *Presentation* area and address standards by which to measure it. For the military intelligence officer at every level, “Our weapons are words, written and spoken”.<sup>30</sup> Unlike *Military Capabilities or Parallel Effort Optimization* where the intelligence officer is expected to be the resident expert, there is a lot of help available to the junior officer needing to refine his or her *Presentation* skills. Nevertheless, as SASO operations are extremely complex, with much ambiguity, it is incumbent upon the training base to provide some tools and experience in presenting complex information to commanders.<sup>31</sup>

Military decision making at the tactical level is not normally made by means of written reports, but rather by means of briefing. The ability to write well is certainly positive. However, most military intelligence officer presentations will not be written, and the focus of this standard will be on oral presentation. The best training for oral presentations is briefing an audience who understands and can role-play the target audience. The standard for this criterion is: (5) both the number of presentations and the quality of the audience. Student *presentations* to the commandant of the school or

Colonels stationed at the school are more valuable than student *presentations* to each other.

The final area in the analytical paradigm was that of *Organic Analysis and Fusion*. Just as conduct of this function is dependent upon an understanding of *Socio-Biographic* information, *Military Capabilities* information, *Parallel Effort Optimization*, and coherent *Presentation*, the training for this area is dependent on the quality of training for the other four.

To recap, how well intelligence officers perform against the criteria will be evaluated against two venues, operational and schoolhouse. For the operational evaluation, Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia will be examined. Particular attention will be paid to the areas of IPB and collection management as they best embed the functional areas identified. In evaluating the schoolhouse curriculum there are five more objective standards recapped below:

1. Quality and quantity of case studies.
2. The degree of lecture versus seminar mode of instruction.
3. The degree of exposure to national level organizations and systems.
4. The quantity and quality of wargames.
5. The number of times briefing an experienced audience.

With this as a framework it is now appropriate to examine the after- action reports of Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia and delve into MIOAC and evaluate the current state of training and education.

## Part II - Training Assessment - Recent Operational AARs

A review of Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia AARs suggests mixed performance in those areas associated with IPB, i.e., *Military Capabilities, Presentation, and Socio-Biographic* intelligence. The review also reveals an overwhelming weakness in collection management and *Parallel Effort Optimization*, associated with it. In the paragraphs that follow each of the earlier developed criteria are examined through the lens of intelligence AARs from the aforementioned operations.

*Military Capabilities* is the raison d'être for Military Intelligence training. It is the natural place to begin. The failure to perform competent *Military Capabilities* analysis is most conspicuous in Somalia where it contributed to the misallocation of forces. As stated in the Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned report:

Defining the battlefield must expand the area of interest to include military, paramilitary, and NGOs. A better definition and description of the battlefield in Somalia (and) a more complete analysis of clan, sub-clan, and warlord alignments and loyalties might have changed the nature of the mission and allocation of forces.<sup>32</sup>

Similarly, the compilation of lessons learned at CMTC during the conduct of the Bosnia- focused Mountain Eagle exercises, is that S-2s do not make the adjustment to factional order of battle tracking and IPB well.<sup>33</sup>

In Haiti conversely, great attention was devoted to modifying the targeting process to the environment and supporting targeting with unique intelligence collection. The targeting mission in Haiti focused on weapons caches in private residences of key personalities within and outside the government. A JTF targeting board met twice daily

with the commanding general to get his approval. Some of the products developed to support targeting in this arena included: drive-by and airborne video, airborne photography, detailed sketch maps and strip maps addressing both the target and the surrounding area (to preclude collateral damage), and information on the key personalities. As a result of this "high-resolution" approach there was a 25% success rate against these extremely ephemeral and well-protected targets.<sup>34</sup>

The success of this targeting not only reflected an ability to track *Military Capabilities* of the targets but was a result of unique approaches to *Presentation* of information to decision makers. The in-country JIC (Joint Intelligence Center - the 10th Mountain G-2 and his staff) created a unique, nonstandard means to portray known and suspected arms caches. A circle divided into four quadrants was color-coded to depict the Haitian unit involved, number of reports, timeliness of reporting, and number of different sources reporting. This tool was essential for visualizing the accuracy, timeliness and nature of potential targets.<sup>35</sup> In part the reason for 10th Mountain G-2's successful adjustment to the *Presentation* requirements for Haiti reflected their experience in Somalia. Many of the senior analysts (but few of the collection managers) had served in Somalia before coming to Haiti. They had learned the hard way. The Center for Army Lessons Learned noted in their compilation of OOTW lessons regarding Somalia, the following:

The standard military situation briefing does not convey the essential information needed for a refugee support operation. The briefing sequence, weather, intelligence, task organization and conduct of the operation do not place enough emphasis on the supported population.<sup>36</sup>

Mountain Eagle AARs also reflected a shortfall in the ability of S-2s to succinctly present data on factional activity in a way that was easily understood by their commanders.<sup>37</sup> The aforementioned difficulties in *Presentation* reflect the biggest challenge in all three operations which was the transition to *Socio-Biographic* information collection, analysis, and presentation. A Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) newsletter captured the extent of the *Socio-Biographic* challenge in Bosnia in the following observation:

US forces, even at the tactical level, found themselves engaged in a political process... commanders could not expect to function successfully using purely military principles and logic. The ability to also manipulate a combination of political power and interests, cultural values, personalities and perhaps most important perceptions was critical to mission success. <sup>38</sup>

Interestingly, a CALL report on Disaster Assistance in the U.S. and elsewhere observed the same shortfall:

Specific requirements for the planning preparation and execution for IPB in disaster assistance operations should be developed. The following should be considered for the IPB process when deploying to a disaster area:

- Location of state and local seats of power
- Names of key officials-elected and professional
- List of agencies working within the area and who is in charge <sup>39</sup>

Clearly this was the area of greatest shortfall during the Somalia operation. The AARs are rife with examples of our inability to appreciate the complexity of the *Socio-Biographic* environment and incorporate it into the intelligence process. The following quote best sums up the myriad of areas requiring intelligence collection and analysis in this environment:

Defining the battlefield must also analyze the host-nation population, government and demographics. Analysis should include housing, health of the population, hospitals, population distribution, ethnic backgrounds, languages, religious beliefs tribe/clan loyalties etc....Add personalities to the usual list of OB factors. Identify leaders and develop psychological profiles. Threat integration for operations characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity require innovative 'paradigm breaking' approaches to capture behavior patterns and develop situational event analyses. Recent experiences show that population groups or hostile elements will behave in some manner which can be identified, measured, timed, depicted graphically, and predicted with some accuracy <sup>40</sup>

The above description is somewhat daunting. Although, as the case of the 10th Mountain in Haiti suggests, experience in one region is easily transferred to another as analysts and leaders become sensitive to the need to focus on these non-traditional factors effecting military operations. The good news is that soldiers with training in dealing with *Socio-Biographic* issues can quickly adapt that training to a new environment. The experience of the SOF in Haiti provides an illustration of this.

... SF soldiers tasked with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT were not area or language oriented...however, because...of past training the soldiers recognized the importance of cultural awareness. Within a matter of days, the SF soldiers knew the customs of the people, allowing them to establish rapport, critical to mission success <sup>41</sup>

It is fair to say that our performance in the areas of *Military Capabilities*, *Presentation*, and *Socio-Biographic* has been mixed. Experience in early operations (Somalia) made a discernible difference in improved performance in later operations (Haiti) for those elements of the 10th mountain G-2 who experienced both. The same cannot be said for our ability to *Optimize Parallel Efforts*.

Difficulty in *Parallel Effort Optimization* has centered on three areas. These are, the inability to optimize production, the inability to optimize traditional collection (national agencies, higher intelligence organizations, etc.), and the inability to optimize non-traditional collection.

A CALL IPB newsletter, focused on IPB in an OOTW environment, observed that S-2s fail to highlight information that cannot be collected at the unit level but must be obtained from higher.<sup>42</sup> A newsletter focused on Joint Military Commissions (JMC) in Bosnia noted that commanders (and their S/G-2's by staff responsibility) often failed to go into JMCs with a good understanding of the positions of the parties regarding the peace agreement issues and that these often failed to be identified to higher intelligence organizations as critical intelligence requirements.<sup>43</sup> Another shortfall was the failure to require specialized experts to conduct analysis to feed the overall assessment of the situation. In Haiti for instance:

HUMINT [was the] primary critical source that required a large commitment of staff resources...However, HUMINT personnel contributed little analytically...field collectors submitted raw reports that carried the caveat ...not trained to do analysis.<sup>44</sup>

In aggregate, intelligence leaders did not manage to distribute production operations in a way that optimized the capabilities of the various levels of intelligence organizations or collectors.

Besides production, both traditional and non-traditional collection efforts were not optimized. Although the JTF-190 (10th Mountain G-2) staff demonstrated an admirable ability to tailor its analytic products (as discussed earlier) to the SASO nature of the

operation, they were not as successful in making the transition from tactical to national collection operations.

JTF-190 collection managers...unfamiliar with national systems...issued unrealistic requests for products and information...collection opportunities were lost...and time was wasted...Collection and dissemination of products were effected by the absence of a clearly defined collection plan. Analysts at Ft. Bragg and JTF-190 were unaware of available products...<sup>45</sup>

Division-level collection managers familiar with Army tactical collection doctrine, systems and procedures operated at a significant disadvantage when thrust into the JTF role. Staff needed more instruction about available collection systems...<sup>46</sup>

The prime vehicle for national systems production is the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). Any ability to leverage national production efficiently requires an intimate knowledge of this machine. However in Haiti:

Many JDISS operators at XVIIIth Airborne Corps were unaware of certain JDISS functions buried deep in the system...field users were denied access to many databases for lack of user ID, a problem that would continue to affect analysts after deploying to Haiti.<sup>47</sup>

Finally, the lack of recognition of the complexity of the problem often resulted in people with the wrong background or experience being charged with leading this complex collection effort. This is best captured in a quote addressing the early challenges in establishing the Task Force Eagle command post in Bosnia:

...there were also early challenges to getting the right intelligence personnel mix. Initially Task Force Eagle (TFE) manned the assault command post with the G2 current operations staff. One problem with this manning is that although the standard G2 shop is good at managing current operations issues and intelligence resources, it doesn't routinely focus on broader, deeper, multi-disciplined intelligence....the G2 section needed an officer who understood how to leverage all ...collection sources ...from National Agency level down to scouts

and patrols.<sup>48</sup>

Along with traditional collection management challenges the SASO environment presented new organizations requiring management and optimization. These new organizations were of two types. The first were non-traditional collection support represented by CIA, DIA NSA and other National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST). The second were NGOs and PVOs. The ability of tactical intelligence officers to make the leap toward managing these organizations was poor. What follows are two observations from Bosnia on the importance of NGOs to the intelligence process :

Most military leaders are not familiar with civilian relief agencies. The importance of their role in an operation ...cannot be overemphasized. Military training programs should include overviews of the identity, missions, capabilities and limitations of these agencies.<sup>49</sup>

...Command post training and leader professional development should increase emphasis on IPB under conditions of OOTW. ...NGOs were another valuable source of intelligence...<sup>50</sup>

From the Somalia experience came the growth of the NIST concept. The NIST was designed to serve as a liaison between the tactical user and national intelligence collection and production organizations not normally in direct support to tactical units. The incorporation of NIST teams was difficult at first. In Haiti, the NIST teams on site frequently had access to better data than the unit they supported.

The NIST access[ed] the SAFE database, which proved essential to obtain biographical information regarding Haitian individuals. Access to these critical files were denied to 10th Mountain analysts for lack of a password... lacking exposure to NIST the staff initially found it difficult to integrate NIST into tactical operations<sup>51</sup>

The importance of effective NIST use is so central to operations in Bosnia that the key G2 leaders of units preparing to assume the Bosnian mission dedicate up to two weeks becoming familiar with their capabilities. Prior to 1st Cavalry Division assuming the Bosnian mission the division commander dedicated an entire week to visiting those Washington D.C. intelligence agencies which would be represented by the NIST team in Task Force Eagle headquarters.<sup>52</sup> Optimal use of NIST teams remains a crucial capability for SASO operations. One of the central lessons learned in the Haiti operation speaks directly to this requirement:

Intelligence planners and operators would benefit from increased awareness of NIST potential uses. Deploying a NIST capability during major training exercises would allow the intelligence personnel to observe the NIST integration...recommend emphasis in resident and correspondence courses on how to integrate NISTs into tactical operations<sup>53</sup>

Having addressed four of the five criteria addressed in the paradigm, it is now appropriate to look at how well the four were integrated during these past operations. How well intelligence organizations adapted to the challenges of SASO operations in order to conduct analysis is revealed by the degree of flexibility and tailoring of the organizations and addresses the final criteria, *Organic Analysis and Fusion*. In Somalia after time the organizations did adjust to the environment.

On the intelligence side, the situation in Somalia, demonstrated that intelligence analysts must be flexible and innovative in their approach to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield... uniqueness of conducting peace enforcement missions in a humanitarian assistance operational environment rendered some of the traditional IPB products (warfighting templates) nonapplicable. However, U.S. forces in Somalia adapted IPB methodology and internally merged requirements for humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping operations.<sup>54</sup>

As the analytical function matured to better reflect the SASO environment, rules of thumb also developed to better judge the quality of intelligence collection.

The JTF J-2 pointed out analyst's rule of 10: Reduce HUMINT reports by a factor of 10. If 400 vehicles were reported treat the figure as 40. The rule of 10 was applied to all Somali sources unless confirmed by other sources. HUMINT information was put through a logic test this meant that time distance factors had to be possible and logical.<sup>55</sup>

In Haiti after some initial challenges in transforming from a division G-2 to an ARFOR G-2, and adjusting to the intelligence requirements of a non-traditional mission, the 10th Mountain was successful in tailoring analysis and fusion processes to the environment. As stated in the operations AAR:

In Haiti, intelligence organizations and systems developed for highly specialized roles and missions were thrust into a situation of extraordinary military, political and diplomatic ambiguity....Intelligence dissemination in Haiti demonstrated that much progress has been made, but significant resources and high level attention are still needed to resolve persisting problems of...operator training and orienting tactical users to the capabilities and limitations of systems.<sup>56</sup>

In Bosnia the analysis and fusion elements have clearly transformed over time into an organization specifically tailored to the environment. This did not come naturally. Mountain Eagle AARs continue to demonstrate a trend to resist link analysis as a means of portraying the enemy and his courses of action.<sup>57</sup>

In conclusion, a review of our recent SASO operations reveals that with practice we can adapt skills designed for HIC *Military Capabilities* analysis to SASO operations. It is not a simple carryover from one to the other. Initial operations in Somalia were poor, and train-ups for Bosnia identified this as a weak area, but analysts experienced in this

area performed admirably in Haiti. Similarly, in the *Presentation* area experience in SASO operations counts. The ability to develop tailored products that adequately display the complexity of a SASO environment is critical but not second nature to those focused on HIC. Central to both these issues is the *Socio-Biographic* nature of SASO. Improving analysts understanding of this environment will directly correlate to improvement in the other two areas. The biggest challenge observed during all three of the operations examined was the ability to *effectively optimize* the collection and production of *parallel efforts*. This was identified as a major shortfall during Haiti:

No suitable collection management courses were available to spin up the G2 staff before deploying for operation Uphold Democracy. The basic and advanced courses lacked substance on collection systems. A collection management shortfall was identified as - training, training, training...<sup>58</sup>

Finally, the ability to tailor organizations in response to the requirements of the environment were successful over time. Most critical was the ability of analysts to adjust the IPB process to each environment. That ability reflected their competence in the five identified functional areas. As stated after Somalia:

The strategic and operational IPB process failed to provide commanders a means to clearly focus the factors of METT-T...IPB must be expanded in scope and tackle the ambiguities of the threats in the inherent complexity of underdeveloped regions.<sup>59</sup>

This historical examination confirms that the five developed functional areas do represent critical Intelligence training requirements. It is now time to take a detailed look at how well MIOAC addresses these functional areas against the standards developed for each.

### **Part III- MIOAC Curriculum Review**

The standard approach to evaluating a military advance course would be to examine the Program Of Instruction (POI). The POI is the military version of both a course curriculum and its embedded series of lesson plans. It normally includes a detailed laydown of resources used, the number of hours dedicated to each task, learning objectives, etc. Development and approval of POI are a time intensive process. The pace of changing requirements for intelligence officer training has been dramatic. This is reflected in a lack of a current POI. In an attempt to remain responsive to recommendations from the field, the instructor cadre at Ft. Huachuca have relied on briefing slides and coordination meetings to elicit leadership approval and rapidly modify the OAC in response to the evolving training requirement. The slides currently depicting the OAC structure and objectives are included at Appendix 1. A series of electronic mail between the author and the commander of the battalion charged with conducting OAC are included at Appendix 2.

Before examining the OAC a review of the standards are in order. As developed earlier there are five key areas that will be examined. They are, quantity and quality of case studies, degree of seminar-type instruction, degree of exposure to organizations and systems needed to optimize parallel efforts, quantity and quality of wargames and number of times briefing an experienced audience.

Before addressing each criterion, it is necessary to look at the course as a whole in terms of objectives and time available. The stated mission of OAC is to "Train Military Intelligence captains to become proficient S2's, ACE (Analytic Control Element) Battle Captains, and company commanders."<sup>60</sup> The schoolhouse is given a total of 88 class days (18 weeks) to accomplish this mission. Of those class days 10 are solely dedicated to Stability and Support Operations.<sup>61</sup> However, SASO has been integrated throughout the Brigade Operations and Intelligence module (hereafter referred to as Brigade O&I) and an additional five days of SASO have recently been added to the Intelligence Support to Division and Corps (ISDC) block of instruction. Clearly, during the past ten months the staff of OAC have made every effort to integrate SASO throughout the curriculum. Nonetheless upon conclusion of examining the current OAC it will be necessary to return and address the overall structure of the TRADOC model.

The first criterion to be examined is that of case studies. The case study standard was developed primarily to determine how well the school addressed the Socio-Biographic area. As this is a key underpinning of SASO-related intelligence analysis it is appropriate that it be examined first. Each OAC class is divided into six squads. Each of these squads is further subdivided into two sections for the contingency operations case study presentation. Each section produces a single case study that is the final graded event for the OAC. In total students hear twelve case studies addressed during a single OAC but present only one.<sup>62</sup> In addition two case studies (Bosnia and Ireland) are instructor delivered. Also, each of the foreign students attending OAC provides a briefing on his or her military's key operations in a case study-type format.<sup>63</sup> There is clearly

recognition by OAC of the value of case studies particularly as they address SASO operations. Even though students pick their case studies, these tend to be focused on Haiti, Somalia or other SASO operations and must be approved by the instructor. Case studies serve as the prime vehicle to drive seminar-type exchanges. The complex operational environment associated with each of the case studies ensures that students are challenged to think critically and imaginatively about problems. The only shortfall in this approach is that the student case studies are presented at the end of the course work.

Looking at case studies alone does not give a complete picture of how the schoolhouse has attempted to integrate *Socio-Biographic* appreciation in its students. Key to teaching this concept is the SASO block of instruction and the Brigade O&I exercise. The SASO week exposes students to the principles of SASO operations as laid out in FM 100-20 (Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict), and IPB for a SASO environment as laid out in FM 34-130 (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield). These field manuals serve as a starting point for the examination of the types of data required in a SASO environment and means by which to present them.<sup>64</sup> Specifically the SASO block addresses population overlays, link and connectivity diagrams, as well as tactical questioning and interviewing skills.<sup>65</sup> The SASO week leads directly into Brigade O&I. The Brigade O&I scenario has a division (of which the brigade is a part) deploying as both a JTF HQ (Joint Task Force Headquarters) forward and the ARFOR (Army Forces) to assist a host nation (hereafter HN) in a counter-insurgency effort. The mission of the brigade is to secure key facilities and free the HN military to deal with the insurgents. Terrorists and guerrilla forces are included in the threat scenario and the exercise

culminates with a conventional force attack by the insurgents.<sup>66</sup> As this operation builds directly on the previous two weeks of SASO training, it reinforces the importance of *Socio-Biographic* type intelligence. Recently the school developed a Country Study for the fictional country they use in the aforementioned scenario.<sup>67</sup> This has greatly enhanced the quality of the *Socio-Biographic* training associated with this event. As the Brigade O&I exercise is both part case study and war game, it is appropriate to now look at the quality and quantity of wargames conducted.

There are three major wargames conducted during OAC. They are a SASO wargame conducted during the SASO block of instruction, the BDE O&I wargame, and a wargame embedded in the ISDC module. Both the SASO wargame and the BDE O&I wargame are conducted in the SASO environment described earlier, the ISDC exercise is a Korean HIC scenario with minor rear battle skirmishes in lieu of SASO. Notably, the SASO case study is personally evaluated by the battalion commander. None of these exercises has any SASO-type simulation and the SASO portions of the wargame are described as “verbally walking through critical events, action/reaction/counteraction, and recording the results.”<sup>68</sup> This problem is beyond the scope of the schoolhouse to solve, but it is critical that it be remedied if we are to have the ability to examine interactively the consequence of differing approaches in a SASO environment.

It is during the ISDC wargame that most collection management operations are interwoven. This wargame is integrated with ASAS (All Source Analysis System) and JDISS training. As ASAS capabilities remain optimized for HIC operations this module is focused on a HIC (Korean) scenario.<sup>69</sup> By association so then are the JDISS and

collection management training during this module.<sup>70</sup> Since events in Haiti and Somalia revealed the shortfall in Army intelligence officers exposure to JDISS, the school has done an admirable job in increasing its focus in this area. The CMD instructor attends refresher training at DIA to ensure currency of information and there is an effort to ensure that Huachuca-based introductory training dovetails with more detailed resource management training available from national agencies.<sup>71</sup> However, as this is clearly the area where AARs show we are weakest, it merits a more detailed examination. Currently, there is limited training on how to leverage the collection of NGOs or PVOs during OAC. The schoolhouse decided that this subject is extremely sensitive and more accurately belongs as a skill set for field grade officers. NGOs and PVOs are addressed in detail during a separate G2/ACE chiefs course as opposed to OAC.<sup>72</sup> Although there is some examination of how to leverage the production capabilities of national agencies, the primary focus is on the collection system management. However, the collection management training is not subject to the same rigor as most of the other training. This is evidenced by the designation of the following three tasks as “knowledge” versus “skills”.

1. Utilize joint and national intelligence capabilities in collection plans.
2. Utilize national and theater-level all source products for intelligence operations.
3. Plan tactical tailoring for split based IEW operations.<sup>73</sup>

Knowledge means the student must understand the topic in his/her head but does not necessarily have to produce anything with it. Skill means the student must produce a product, i.e., a DST (Decision Support Template) or ISM (Intelligence Support Matrix).<sup>74</sup> This implies a less rigorous focus on these vital tasks. Currently there is no focused collection management course. The strategy is that collection management is a core

competency of MI officers and as such must be embedded throughout OAC and follow-on additional skill training courses which all OAC graduates attend.<sup>75</sup> This embedded training does not currently address the RMS (Resource Management System) or JCMT (Joint Collection Management Tool). These two systems are as critical to modern leveraging of national systems as is JDISS to access national production. It is critical that once the schoolhouse has acquired these systems (they are in the process of doing so) the course be modified to include them. Finally, nowhere in the course curriculum is integration and use of a NIST team mentioned as an objective. Examination of the AARs from Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia clearly identifies effective integration of a NIST as a major shortcoming. Recently the G2/ACE chief's course has added a module on use of the NIST team. This includes briefings by former NIST team members from recent operations. These same guest instructors do address the OAC in session during the time of their visit. NIST has also been added to the ISDC study guide.<sup>76</sup>

The large amount of time dedicated to exercises and hands-on training on ASAS and JDISS leaves relatively little classroom time. Of the total course only 20% is pure classroom time. However, all of this is lecture.<sup>77</sup> The school has done everything possible to integrate seminar vice lecture type training. The case study presentations are actually jumping off points for seminar discussion. Lectures are limited to those common core courses mandated by TRADOC which are conducted in lecture fashion to ensure consistency across branches.

The final area for review is that of briefings. Each student gives approximately five briefings during OAC. The nature of these briefings varies but all reflect some

portion of the intelligence cycle. Students primarily brief their squad advisor, though some will have an opportunity to conduct a brief for the school battalion commander or his brigade commander. The squad advisors are majors serving as instructors in the school or as XO/S-3 of the school cadre battalion. Each is selected and validated by the battalion commander before assuming their duties. At one time the school attempted to leverage the lieutenant-colonels and colonels serving at Ft. Huachuca to receive student briefs. They discovered that competing requirements, conflicting schedules and general unfamiliarity with the scenarios prevented participation by these senior officers from being effective.<sup>78</sup>

On balance, a detailed review of the OAC curriculum reveals a clear appreciation of the lessons learned from our recent SASO experiences. There is a comprehensive effort to embed SASO related training wherever possible. The integration of the Brigade O&I and SASO modules is a great effort in this direction. Ongoing efforts to develop a detailed country study is another positive initiative, as is the development of a Humanitarian Assistance exercise. The presentation of the Northern Ireland and Bosnian case studies as well as the presentation of SASO-related case studies by students all reflect a heavy focus on this mission requirement.

Nonetheless there remain areas for improvement. Neither case studies nor wargames are truly interactive. As a result students are limited in their ability to test various solutions against a given scenario. Case studies are group work presented towards the end of the course - a period when students are generally least focused. Current

collection management focus is heavily HIC and does not give sufficient exposure to NGO/PVO or NIST integration.

Most of the shortfalls identified above are a function of time available. Time and emphasis within OAC are dramatically effected by two factors. The first is the requirement to adhere to the TRADOC model. Currently there are as many days dedicated to TRADOC core curriculum courses (primarily focused on company command)<sup>79</sup> as there are days for SASO specific training.<sup>80</sup> The other major factor competing for time is the grim reality that a fairly large percentage of each graduating class will be assigned to Korea immediately after OAC.<sup>81</sup> Both of these factors are related. Because the TRADOC model mandates a continuous OAC course (versus a modular one) the course must address the full range of required training in the time available.

The last portion of this paper addresses shortfalls in OAC from two perspectives. The first addresses what can be improved within the constraints of the TRADOC model, the second suggests training options that would become available were the structure more flexible. In each case these recommendations will focus on how to improve the quality and time available to conduct SASO case studies, seminars and wargames, and how to improve the depth of exposure to NGOs/PVOs, NIST and other parallel efforts.

## **Part IV Recommendations and Conclusions**

In examining how to improve the curriculum under the current TRADOC model this paper addresses the shortfalls in priority, with the order based on degree of weakness in the current curriculum.

It is critical that the Army develop a SASO wargame that has enough depth and complexity to allow students to run multiple iterations and gather lessons learned. The strength of the Battle Command Training Program has been it's ability to expose leaders to a thinking enemy and allow organizations through multiple iterations to develop staff procedures and warfighting strategies to defeat that enemy. The field is replete with examples of this. The Apache deep strike and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures were a direct outgrowth of the need to develop a mechanism to defeat OPFOR deep fires during BCTP.<sup>82</sup>

Currently there is no such wargame for a SASO environment. However, the building blocks for such a wargame exist at Ft. Huachuca. Detailed scenario development, to include biographic sketches, well developed, friendly, enemy and neutral organizations, maps and scripted reactions to friendly actions have all been (or are being) developed in concert with the BDE O&I and SASO course. At this time these are not put together in a coherent replicable wargame but rather represent stand alone vignettes.<sup>83</sup> It is critical to develop an action plan now using these building blocks to develop a TRADOC SASO model. The current CAPSTONE exercise throughout TRADOC focuses on Korea. This is in part because of the high percentage of advanced course graduates of all

branches who go there upon graduation. If the current wisdom is correct, Korea will either implode or explode in the next few years in response to worsening shortages in the economy.<sup>84</sup> We must begin now to address the gap in our training model for when the Korean threat diminishes. The most likely candidate is SASO training. The time to develop the wargame is now.

The second most critical shortfall is *Parallel Effort Optimization* training. This effort is so important that it deserves a separate block of instruction. The current strategy which states that it is a core competency and as such is integrated throughout the course results in loss of direct responsibility for this material.<sup>85</sup> A course which addresses holistically, strategies for distributing production, managing collection from national agencies, interfacing with NGOs, PVOs and other services would be of great benefit. Bringing in former NIST members as well as PVO or NGO representatives would also provide great value. The operational AARs demonstrate this shortfall across the board. The current distributed approach does not ensure that this shortfall is addressed head-on and remedied.

Integration of case studies is generally good. The only recommended change is that it be spread over the course of OAC rather than clustered at the end. This provides two benefits. The first is that it allows later groups to learn from earlier groups and allows the instructor to demand more robust and detailed case studies over time. It also dilutes the last item on the plate syndrome. Several students mentioned that their goal for the case study was simply to get it finished. At the end of OAC they were focused on graduation and their next assignment.<sup>86</sup>

The *Presentation* aspect of the course is well done. The students get plenty of podium time (five briefs) and they explore innovative ways to present complex SASO-related information. Currently only one student per squad is put through what is termed a “murder board”. This requires the student to brief the current SASO related situation (this is conducted during Brigade O&I) to the brigade commander. This is by all accounts a tough and demanding presentation.<sup>87</sup> The bulk of the students do their presentation to their squad advisors. The very nature of a mentor relationship between those briefing and those receiving the brief may reduce the effectiveness of the process. Briefers should not feel too safe when going through the briefing experience. Much like battle, “the more sweat in peacetime, the less blood in war.” Although every brief need not be adversarial it is useful that at least some are. The only recommendation that seems feasible given the problems experienced in bringing to bear some of the senior talent on post, is that students give at least one briefing to a squad advisor who does not know them. This briefing should be adversarial in nature with the “outside advisor” being critical to the point of unreasonableness. This ensures that graduates do not leave the schoolhouse with a false expectation that everyone they will brief will have their best interests at heart (as the squad advisor most certainly should).<sup>88</sup>

There are no discernible ways the curriculum can increase seminar instruction within the current TRADOC model.

Overall, then, the current OAC is doing an admirable job in adjusting the course to the historic shortfalls of intelligence soldiers during SASO operations. This reflects the senior leadership's recognition of the problems of the past and the courage to explore new

ways to prepare students for the future. Some of the initiatives being added to future classes include eighteen hours of mandatory chess per day as well as experimentation with use of commercial simulations. This is an attempt to train OAC students to look several moves ahead and visualize multiple futures simultaneously. Were the current TRADOC model not a constraining limit on innovation some more dramatic changes would be possible.

Instead of the current eighteen week OAC, a OAC of eight weeks with five two week tailored modules taken over the course of the next seven years, would provide flexibility in training and education. In eight weeks OAC could expose students to common skills. These include: conduct of IPB in HIC and SASO, general use of Intellink (intelligence classified Internet), presentation and briefing skills, etc. The two week classes would be focused on specific jobs (collection manager, Brigade/Battalion S-2, battle captain, Korea, Bosnia etc). The student would be required to attend a two week program at least once every eighteen months and the officers command would be required to; request the course they want the student to attend, fund the TDY, and release the student. The advantages in such an approach would be enormous. First the command would have a vested interest in what the student learns and the student would carry an expectation of his/her command with them when they attend school. This would empower distance learning. An officer selected to attend the collection managers course by his/her command would be expected to have some requisite knowledge when they arrived at school. This could be achieved through use of distance learning modules provided prior to their attending the in-resident portion. The eighteen month refresher

would hold Army officers to the same professional development standards that civilian professionals (doctors and lawyers for example) maintain to remain current in their profession. Finally, a constant revisit of soldiers from the field would ensure currency of fieldcraft at the schoolhouse. The Army has demonstrated with the administration of the Combined Arms Staff and Services School that units can plan for the limited TDY of officers if the program is supported and understood by the Army's senior leaders.

Leaders at Fort Huachuca have done an outstanding job in dramatically altering OAC in response to a changing environment. Most of the current shortfalls reflect Army wide as opposed to schoolhouse specific weaknesses. Although the changes already made and those planned for the future will greatly improve the quality of MIOAC graduates to respond to SASO they are not enough. The world in which our Army will operate in the future will be complex and ever changing. It does not make sense to continue to embrace an educational system that is staggered with four year (between basic course and advanced course), seven year (between advanced course and Command and General Staff Course (CGSC)) and eight year (between CGSC and War College) increments. As the Army's training and education evolves in response to new technologies and emerging threats it is imperative that we restructure our paradigm to take full advantage of technological and human potential.




## Advanced MI Officer Training




304th Military Intelligence Battalion

**MI Officer Advanced Course**



MI Grad School!



## Purpose

To present current and future developments in advanced MI Officer training




## Method - Agenda

- Mission
- Overview
- OAC
- Possible Cuts
- RC-OAC
- Conclusion

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


# MI Officer Training Strategy



- MI Training Focused on Key Assignments at each Echelon
- Upgraded Technical Training with OAC & Functional Courses

**MI Grad School!**



# MI Officer Advanced Course

## 18 Weeks



**Mission:** Train Military Intelligence CPTs to become proficient S2's, ACE Battle Captains, and company commanders.


10 days 10 days 10 days 20 days 19 days 19 days

TRADOC COMMON CORE	THREAT AND ANALYSIS	S&SO	BRIGADE OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE	INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DIVISION AND CORPS	ASAS CAPSTONE
--------------------	---------------------	------	-------------------------------------	--	---------------

CORE COMPETENCIES (ANALYSIS, SYSTEMS, COLLECTION MANAGEMENT, ARMY OPS, LEADER SKILLS)

- ✓ Focused on training BN/BDE S2s, ACE Battle Captains, & Company Commanders
- ✓ Progressively more difficult; BN/BDE → Division → Corps
- ✓ Combination of Info Age System training and traditional S2 tasks (CTC trends)

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# Mission-Focused Critical Skills and Knowledge



## Battalion & Brigade S2

- Conduct IPB.
- Process and analyze intelligence and combat information.
- Determine and develop enemy courses of action.
- Produce situation templates for operations at BN/BDE level.
- Perform predictive analysis.
- Determine/recommend PIR.
- Execute collection management at BDE/BN level (recon/counterrecon).
- Develop a decision support template during wargaming ICW staff.
- Apply the targeting process during the MDMP.
- Develop HPT/AGM/TSS during wargaming.
- Produce and brief an S2 Mission Analysis Briefing.
- Produce and brief an Intelligence Estimate.
- Apply the MDMP and provide the expected S2 contributions at the BDE/BN level.

## ACE Battle Captain

- Plan and execute collection management.
- Utilize corps/division intelligence collection systems IAW their capabilities in a collection plan.
- Produce division Intelligence Annex.
- Supervise and operated automated intelligence processing operations (ASAS).
- Provide Intel support to Force Protection operations.
- Conduct crisis action planning.
- Operate INTELINK/JDISS.
- Utilize joint and national intelligence capabilities in collection plans.
- Utilize national and theater- level all source products for intel operations.
- Plan tactical tailoring for split based IEW Ops.
- Provide intel support to targeting.

## Company Commander

- Plan and execute IEWOPS in support of BDE operations.
- Utilize the capabilities of IEW DS and GS company assets.
- Produce and brief a company OPORD.
- Produce connectivity diagrams for all IEW assets within divisional DS and GS companies.
- Establish a unit intelligence training program.
- Plan tactical CI operations.
- Supervise supply/maintenance operations at company level.
- Achieve proficiency in all Captains Career Course Common Core Requirements.



**Note:**  
**Knowledge="Apply & utilize"**  
**Skills="Produce, operate, determine, participate, install, employ, conduct, execute"**

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# MI Leader Development

## MIOAC



- Army Operations
- How to be a MI
- Company Commander

### Fighting the Brigade ...

- IPB support to MDMP
- Recon & Surveillance Ops
- Predictive Analysis
- MI CO FTX: Hands-on equipment training in the field, situational environment
- 20 days in TOC
- 4-hr. application-based hands-on exam

Division, Corps, & JTF (Korea)  
• Collection Management:  
Division, Corps, EAC, & Joint Assets

- Systems Training (14 days): ASAS, Intelink, JDISS
- Crisis Action PE
  - real-world crisis exercise
  - ACE chief duties
  - Pull national IMINT & access national databases

- 1 x Corps ACE
- 2 x Division ACE
- Test analysis and collection management in a dynamic environment

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# Common Core (9 Days)

<b>A = ASAS</b>	<b>L = AER Counseling</b>
<b>B= Static Display</b>	<b>M= S&amp;SO</b>
<b>C= Common Core</b>	<b>N= nk Threat</b>
<b>D= Seminars</b>	<b>O= Bde O&amp;I</b>
<b>F= FTX</b>	<b>P= In / Outprocessing</b>
<b>G= Graduation</b>	<b>T= Threat</b>
<b>I= ISDC</b>	<b>X= Capstone Exercise</b>
<b>K= CAT Brief</b>	<b>Z= Foreign Army Threat</b>

## Skills and Knowledge

- Roles of OCMI
- Implement Suicide Prevention Program
- Implement the Army's Equal Opportunity & Sexual Harassment Program
- Implement the Army's Family Team Building Program
- Establish a positive Cmd climate & Take charge of a unit (Command Seminar)
- Build a cohesive unit & Develop subordinate leaders in a company (NCO Seminar)
- Use Military History critical thinking skills for advanced training
- Administer Military Justice
- Intell Oversight Training
- Conduct Company Operations IAW Law of Land Warfare
- Train a Company & plan Bn training
- Identify duties, responsibilities & authority of warrants
- Perform tasks in a Civilian/ military group
- Direct unit MAIN T Program
- Supervise supply operations
- Conduct change of command inventory

Given	Produce
Student Handouts Classroom Instruction Reading Assignments	Family Care Packet Command Philosophy Intelligence Battle Analysis

## Evaluation Strategy

- Two Written Exams




**50%**  
Hands-on

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# Analysis & Threat (10 Days)



A = ASAS	L = AER Counseling
B= Static Display	M= S&SO
C= Common Core	N= nK Threat
D= Seminars	O= Bde O&I
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## Skills and Knowledge

- Develop Threat model
- Develop threat COAs
- OPFOR organizations and equipment
- Threat doctrinal principals
- North Korean operations and tactics
- North Korean organizations and equipment
- Iraqi operations and tactics
- Operate OSIS
- Operate JDIISS and Intelink

**50%** **Hands-on**



Given	Produce	Evaluation Strategy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BDE/DIV orders</li> <li>• Terrain Boards/Micro Armor</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Foreign Army Threat Briefing - GO/NOGO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exam</li> <li>• Evaluated briefings - GO/NO GO</li> </ul>

## Evaluation Strategy

- Exam
- Evaluated briefings - GO/NO GO

# MI Grad School!



# Brigade Operations & Intelligence


(20 Days)

P	C	C	C	C	C	C	T	T	T	M	M
M	M	M	M	M	M	M	T	T	T	T	T
Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	T	T	T	N	N
I	I	I	I	I	I	I	T	T	T	I	I
A	A	A	A	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	M

A = ASAS  
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 Z= Foreign Army Threat

**80%  
Hands-on**



## Skills & Knowledge

- Conduct IPB.
- Determine and develop enemy courses of action.
- Produce situation templates for operations at BN/BDE level.
- Perform predictive analysis.
- Determine/recommend PIR.
- Apply the MDMP and the S2s contribution to the MDMP at BDE/BN level.
- Execute collection management at BDE/BN level (recon/counter-recon).
- Apply the targeting process.
- Apply and Develop the HPT/AGM/TSS during wargaming.
- Produce and brief an S2 Mission Analysis Briefing.
- Produce and brief an Intelligence Estimate/Summary.
- Process and analyze intelligence and combat information.

Given	Produce
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Classroom instruction</li> <li>• Fac Advisor Program</li> <li>• Notetaking guide</li> <li>• Student notes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SITEMP w/3 ECOAs</li> <li>• R&amp;S overlay and matrix</li> <li>• ISM, TSM</li> <li>• All S2/S3 MDMP briefings and products</li> </ul>

## Evaluation Strategy


- Squads brief products to class, Squad Advisors
- Block Exam - 4 hours, Hands-on, application based, graduate level, 75%

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# Stability & Support Operations (10 Days)



A = ASAS  
 B= Static Display  
 C= Common Core  
 D= Seminars  
 E= FTX  
 G= Graduation  
 I= ISDC  
 K= CAT Brief

L= AER Counseling  
 M= S&SO  
 N= nk Threat  
 O= Bde O&I  
 P= In / Outprocessing  
 T= Threat  
 X= Capstone Exercise  
 Z= Foreign Army Threat

**75%**  
Hands-on



## Skills & Knowledge

- Apply MDDMP in a S&SO environment
- Produce/brief S-2 mission analysis
- Apply the IPB process to S&SO
- Apply the IPB process to S&SO
- Conduct crisis action planning
- Basic tactical questioning skills
- Basic interpersonal & interview skills
- HUMINT - National, Tactical & Allied/Coalition level
- MI role in CT & CD

Given	Produce
S&SO scenario	SITTEMP
S&SO- specific	• EVENT TEMP
OPFOR	• DST
High volume msg traffic	• Population Overlay
PE	• Key Facilities Overlay
Mission analysis	• Link Diagram
PE	• Connectivity diagram
Crisis action PE	• Case Study

## Evaluation Strategy

- Exam
- Evaluated briefings - GO/NO GO
- Case Study - BN Cdr Graded



# ASAS Training

(12 Days)

P	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	T	T	T	M	M
M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	T	T	T	O	O
O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Z	Z	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
I	I	I	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	K	M	M	M	P	G
■	■	■	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	M	M	P	G

## Skills & Knowledge

L= AER Counseling

M= S&SO  
N= nk Threat  
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P= In / Outprocessing  
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A = ASAS  
B= Static Display  
C= Common Core

D= Seminars  
F= FTX  
G= Graduation

I= ISDC  
K= CAT Brief

- Operate ASAS
- Operate RWS
- Operate JDISS
- Operate Intelink
- Systems capabilities
- Systems connectivity
- Role of the ACT
- Produce

**100%**  
Hands-on



Given	Produce
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Systems</li> <li>• PEs</li> <li>• Scenarios</li> <li>• Operator manuals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SITEMP</li> <li>• DST</li> <li>• Graphic INTSUM</li> </ul>

## Evaluation Strategy

- Three Quizzes
- Written Exam - 75%



# Capstone Exercise


(7 Days)

P	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	T	T	M	M
M	N	M	M	M	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	O	O	O	O
O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	B	O	O	O
Z	Z	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	N	N	N	N
I	I	I	K	K	K	K	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	M	M	M	G

## Skills & Knowledge

A = ASAS  
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- Prepare/brief intelligence Mission Analysis
- Produce/brief collection plan
- Execute dynamic collection management
- Execute intel support to the targeting process
- Utilize the targeting process
- Produce
  - SITEMP
  - EVENTEMP
  - DST
- Perform battle tracking/analysis
- Determine enemy
  - COAs
  - HVTS
  - HPTs
- Role of DSMI Cdr
- Employ IEW assets
- Operate RWS WLNB




Given	Produce
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scenario (offense)</li> <li>• BDE/DIV OPORD</li> <li>• RWS WLNB</li> <li>• Simulated msg traffic</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RWS WLNB graphics</li> <li>• Mission Analysis Briefings:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decision</li> <li>• Collection Plan</li> <li>• Battle Tracking</li> <li>• OPORD</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## Evaluation Strategy

- Graded briefings - GO/NO GO

**100%**  
Hands-on

**MI Grad School!**



# OAC Squad Advisor Program



**Purpose:** To train, coach, and mentor OAC students with a dedicated, senior instructor per squad

## Concept of Operation:

- Stay with same squad throughout the OAC
- Take all PE briefings
- Constantly engaged with squad (training & morale)
- True coach, mentor, trainer



## The Squad Advisors

MAJ Hoehne (XO), MAJ Stanley (S3), MAJ Corbett (OAC), MAJ Barefoot (O&I), MAJ Cephus (FA), MAJ Nichol (S&SO)

## ADV

- ✓ Expert at PE scenarios & doctrine
- ✓ Efficient & effective cadre AARs
- ✓ Know the good, bad, and ugly of the OAC students

## DISAD

- ✓ 75 hour workweeks
- regular job
  - 4 -8 hr wk per OAC squad
  - 2 -3 OACs in session same time
- ✓ All Bn mtgs after 1730 or during student lunch hour

**MI Grad School!!**

From: trautman@HUACHUCA-EMH1.ARMY.MIL  
To: ROTKOFFS@LEAV-EMH1.ARMY.MIL; stanleym@HUACHUCA-EMH1.ARMY.MIL  
Subject: RE: Request for materials  
Date: Sunday, November 01, 1998 3:03PM

Konrad.

I've reviewed the slides you sent laying out the OAC. I have several questions, the answers to which impact the direction of my paper.. Steve

Questions follow, thanks again.

Question 1. Is there a cross-walk between the DIA courses in CM, analysis, systems etc and the aspects of these functions addressed in OAC. In other words, is the OAC element of CM training a synopsis of what you get at DIA or is it a precursor to what you get at DIA?

Answer 1: For CM it is definitely a precursor. The Army doctrine for CM is slightly different from the joint doctrines. The joint folks don't emphasize dissemination task as heavily as the Army, and their organization is different, too. They divide CM into two distinct functions: requirements management and collection operations. They also have a different format for collection planning. But the key elements are the same. I say that our is a precursor because once you know the Army system, it is very easy to adjust to the joint procedures. The fact that the Army collection managers do play with joint collection assets, data bases, and reports, also allows the student to more easily transition to the joint operations. Moreover, our key instructor for CM is actually today back in DC attending the DIA CM course to ensure that we are synch with what they are teaching. I don't know the details of the DIA Analysis, training, other than it is nowhere as strong as the CM tng. The Systems training I refer to targets systems like RMS and JCMT which USAIC will integrate into our POIs this FY.

Slide #5 Mission-Focused Critical Skills and Knowledge

## Question 2. [REDACTED]

**Answer 2.** Knowledge which the student must have in order to do the task easily

Question 4. At first glance there appears to be no SASO embedded in this, is there any SASO embedded?

Answer 4. The entire Bde O&I block is S&SO. There are two weeks preceding this that are pure S&SO, too, that sets the stage for the PEs they will do in O&I. In the ISDC block the students do 3 major PEs, one of which is a force projection operation into a S&SO environment. Finally, the Capstone exercise has one cell that is focused on a S&SO type threat, vice NK threat.

Slide 8 Analysis & Threat

.. Who is the recipient of the evaluated briefings?  
.. Either the block instructor or the Sqd Advisors.

Question 6. A review of skills and knowledge listing appears that SASO type threats are not addressed and that this is designed for likely MRCs - is this correct?

Answer 6. Neither really. The students research, via OSIS, a third-world type country that is/could be a potential contingency area in their future assignment. Say....~~etc~~ The students conducts a tactical-level analysis of how that army would conduct offensive or defensive operations. Probably not many templates available, and that is the point. A huge advantage here is the 15 international officers we have in each OAC. They make presentations on how their div, rgt, bdes fight. From an analytical perspective, it is great for the OAC students to hear how others do their operations. Emphasizes the fact that there is no real template. Now, I wouldn't call any of this MRC focused, although Iraq could easily be one of the countries, nor is it focused on the TBM, nuke, bio, or chem threats. Those latter topics are covered in lecture/seminar, but not as part of the research project.

#### Slide 11 Intel support to Division and corps

Question 7. Under skills and knowledge one of the skills listed is "Provide intel support to planning and execution of support and stability operations" Can I get some more detail on this? What is the measure of effectiveness, how much time devoted to this etc? Do you examine/critique past operations(Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia)?

Answer 7. This PE is the force projection PE into a S&SO environment that requires the student to deliver a msn analysis briefing, an intel arch diagram, and plan the echelonment/deployment of his/her intel assets into theater. It is much more of an ACE Chief's connectively and deployment drill, vice a S&SO drill. Within the S&SO block we do provide instructor-delivered case studies of Bosnia and N. Ireland. The students themselves will research and deliver case studies on Haiti, Somalia, etc. in the final week of the course.

Question 8. Is it possible to get a sample of a Humanitarian Assistance Mission Analysis & Intel Support Concept produced by students?

Answer 8. Our lead instructor is currently upgunning this PE. If you can wait on this one, I can get it to you later.

#### Slide 12 ASAS Training

Question 9. ~~What is the HIC exercise and how is SASO applications?~~

Answer 9. It is ~~done~~. We have made it work in a S&SO environment (ElSalvador) in the past, but it was too

~~time consuming, involving many people, and training intensive.~~

~~More recently we have started to use some products available (as in most, and not all, of the software is free) for doing exercises like this, plotting anything.~~

#### Slide 13 Capstone Exercise

Question 10. Looks again like a HIC exercise are there any embedded SASO refugees, warlords etc?

Answer 10. It is a NK scenario. We have embedded some S&SO into this, but it is really more of a rear battle play than true LIC. We're toying with options of how to change this, but with all of the other S&SO emphasis we really have, one week on the ASAS machines in a Korea scenario is not a bad idea. It still is one of our two MRCs, and many, many of our grads go the 2nd ID right after the OAC.

elements ie NGO play.



Rotkoff, Steven LTC ROTKOFFS

**From:** trautman@HUACHUCA-EMH1.ARMY.MIL  
**To:** ROTKOFFS@LEAV-EMH1.ARMY.MIL  
**Subject:** RE: Request for materials  
**Date:** Saturday, December 05, 1998 12:20PM

Konrad.

Based on my work this weekend i have some additional questions

Question 1. You have stated that BDE OPNs is SASO related, but the skills and knowledge for Bn and BDE s-2's looks pretty HIC.

Answer 1. Basic labels of the skills and knowledge sets are the same, i.e. conduct IPB, determine ECOSs, perform predictive analysis - but they are all scoped to the Stability Op. Of note, during the last week of the 4 week drill, the neighboring bad guy country does invade, and it is in that phase of the O&I tng that the students use the same skills then scoped towards a conventional defense. Bottom Line: skills are generally applicable to both stability ops and traditional offense/defense, but in this block we spend 75% of the time in the stability ops environment.

Question 2. Are the templates, COAs, PIR, wargame etc listed as BN BDE S-2 skills and knowledge SASO, HIC or both? Both. As you know the types template, PIR etc are generally very different depending on the environment.

**Answer 2. Exactly.** That's why we run the students thru the conventional phase in the end. The ECOA sketches, analysis, PIR, R&S planning (oh that HUMINT stuff) is radically different. Students are definitely challenged by changing gears in this op, but that is also the reality of the world we're in.

Question 3. How is the socio-biographic play in the BDE OPNs piece, i.e. politics, biography of key figures, and time.

Quantitative ROC

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**Question 5. Do students get to create their own versions of the templates in the recent 34-130 chapter 32?**

Answer 5. Yes, exactly. But we also add some other FMP that aren't in the FM, i.e. I think our ECOA sketches, which are very similar to our friendly COA sketches, are much better than the FM's traditional sketches of COAs.

Question 6. Do you use 100-20 to work them through the thought process 4- SACCs

Answer B Yes. Prior to the Q1 block is the S<sub>2</sub> SO block that contains this element.

~~PROMINT topics~~

Question 7. What is the average class size is 12 case studies per class becomes how many teamed per case study?

Answer 7. 4-5 students per case study team. It is 1/3 of their squad that they go thru the OAC with.

Question 8. I am a little confused by your response to my last email.  
You say the students participate in a SASO wargame yet later go on to say there is no real SASO simulation available. How do you conduct the wargame?

Answer 8. The old fashioned way. verbally walking thru the critical events, action/reaction/counteraction, and recording the results.

Question 9. LAST AND MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION: Do you object to my using your email responses as an attachment and reference in my paper?

Answer 9. No, but pls let me review prior to publication.

## ENDNOTES

1. Robert D Kaplan, The Ends of The Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century, (New York: Random House, 1996), 8.
2. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996 Strategic Assessment, ed. Hans Binnendijl (National Defense University, 1996), 61-62.
3. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning, (Lillington NC: Edwards Brothers), 13.
4. U.S. Army Field Manual 34-8, Combat Commanders Handbook on Intelligence, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army (hereafter HQDA), 1992) Chapter 3.
5. Defense Intelligence Agency, Vector 21 A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office (hereafter GPO), 1998), 8-10.
6. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-11, Force Integration, (Washington D.C.: HQDA, 1995) Section VI.
7. William Johnson, Force Planning Considerations for Army XXI, (Strategic Studies Institute, Feb. 1998), 19.
8. Brigadier General Wayne Hall, "End of September Stray Voltage: Functions of Military Intelligence in 2010 in Tactical Units", Sept. 1998, 4-5.
9. Intelligence XXI Study, 'Threat Panel White Paper', August 1998, 13.
10. General John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996), 11
11. Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, The Age of Revolution, (The Letort Papers, March 1998), 7. According to LTG Kennedy, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the enemies of the future will "...include warlords, tribal chiefs, drug traffickers, international criminal cartels, terrorists and cyber-bandits..."
12. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997 Strategic Assessment, ed. Hans Binnendijl (National Defense University, 1997), 11. The 1997 Strategic Assessment identifies an entire category of conflict as those associated with 'troubled states.' The assessment defines these as "...a growing propensity by people in many countries to turn away from the state toward ethnic, tribal, religious or other forms of separatism..."
13. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 125. Michael Ignatieff has covered this in detail where he states "... Of the nearly fifty conflicts today (1997), few conform to the classic

pattern of professional war...they include army insurrections...guerrilla campaigns ...ethnic-minority uprisings...and jackal gangs roaming freely...In these conflicts civilians are always in the line of fire..."

Note: References 14, 15, 16 and 17 below all refer to asymmetrical threats.

14. Joint Vision 2010 , 11.

15. Army Vision 2010 , 7.

16. .US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Draft), (Washington D.C.: HQDA, TBP) XVIII.

17. President William J. Clinton, A National Military Strategy, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1997), 1.

18. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-75, Intel XXI A Concept for Force XXI Operations (Draft), (Washington D.C.: HQDA, TBP), 3-11. The new TRADOC Pam 525-75 states, "In Force XXI intelligence, operators will be required to direct the full range of intelligence assets to include organic, joint, national and multinational."

19. Alan Goldman, "The Threat Environment in Peace -Related Operations" Military Intelligence, Apr.-June 1996, 37. Alan Goldman from the National Ground Intelligence Center characterizes future conflict with five broad generalizations shown below. The first three and the fifth reaffirm observations described above, the fourth captures the difficulty in understanding enemy intent in anticipated operations.

1. Rivals live contiguously with ethnic differences
2. Noncombatants as victims
3. An ethic of 'do unto others before others do unto you' prevails.
- 4.... compromise will be interpreted as weakness...arguments for peace based on cost-benefit analysis will rarely be persuasive...
5. The enemy ...will find innovative ways to employ force...

20. Daniel Bolger, Savage Peace Americans at War in the 1990's, (Novato C.A.: Presidio Press, 1995), 378. "You don't get your picture on the cover of Newsweek by killing Canadians. You've got to kill Americans" Major General Lewis MacKenzie, Canadian Army

21. Ibid, 389.

22. The author personally experienced these kinds of confusing assessments from higher intelligence organizations while serving at various times as a battalion, and brigade S-2 and as a division G-2.

23. In preparation for 1st Cavalry Division's assumption of Multi-National Division-North HQ responsibility the author, along with several other intelligence leaders of the 1st Cavalry Division, traveled throughout Europe (to include Bosnia) from April to May of 1998. All of us were struck by the great disparity of assessments with regard to when the Train and Equip program could be expected to affect the balance of military capability among the Bosnian factions.

24. Richard S. Friedman, "Open Source Intelligence" Parameters, Summer 1998, 161.

25 Intelligence XXI Study "Mission Essential Task List: Army Intelligence 2010", entire document.

26. FM 100-5 Operations (Draft) , 2-6.

27. US Army Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, (Washington D.C.: HQDA, 1998), Chapter 6.

28. This sentiment was expressed by several US Army Military Intelligence General Officers in various fora attended by the author during the period June - Sept. 1998.

29 A good example of this is the evolution of Measurements Intelligence (MASINT) in support of tactical operations. Just a few years ago all MASINT technologies and capabilities were in the 'black' world and completely unknown to tactical intelligence officers at corps and below. After exposure to these capabilities in Bosnia the tactical community recognizes the need for hand-held tactical MASINT capabilities and has learned to ask for these systems.

30. A favorite saying of Colonel (Ret) Kevin Vargas a distinguished tactical MI soldier.

31. The author's own struggles preparing 1st Cavalry Division leaders going to Bosnia to understand different factional capabilities, dispositions and interests without portraying any as the 'good or bad guy'.

32. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report 3 December 1992-4 May 1993 , (Ft. Leavenworth KS, May 1998), 6-7.

33. Center for Army Lessons Learned, CMT Trends Compendium - SASO , (Ft. Leavenworth KS, April 1998) 1-7.

34. Restore Hope Lessons Learned , 4-35.

35. Ibid, 4-34

36. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operations Other Than War Volume I Humanitarian Assistance, (Ft. Leavenworth KS. December 1992) 3.

37. CMT Trends compendium- SASO, 1-7.
38. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Drawing A Line In The Mud - Newsletter", May 1996, 1.
39. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operations Other Than War Volume II Disaster Assistance, (Ft Leavenworth KS, October 1993), I-8.
40. Restore Hope Lessons Learned, I-18.
41. Operations Other Than War Volume I Humanitarian Assistance, 12.
42. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "IPB Newsletter", December 1996, VI-6.
43. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Joint Military Commission Newsletter", September 1996, II-2.
44. C4I Integration and Support Activity, Operation Uphold Democracy. An Assessment of Intelligence and Communications Systems and Networks, (Washington DC December 1995), 5-8.
45. Ibid, 4-36.
46. Ibid, 5-13.
47. Ibid, 4-4.
48. Major Mark Dickens, "Task Force Eagle- Assault Command Post", News From The Front, May-June 1996, 21.
49. Operations Other Than War Volume I Humanitarian Assistance, 19.
50. Captain Philip Parker, "IPB in OOTW", News From The Front, March 1994, 5-7.
51. Operation Uphold Democracy, 4-37.
52. Author planned 1st Cavalry Division commanding general visit to DC focused on NIST agency tours and prepared successor on the job training schedule to include two weeks with NIST teams in Tuzla.
53. C4I Integration and Support Activity, Operation Restore Hope. A Communications and Intelligence Assessment, (Washington DC November 1994), 5-17.

54. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook for Soldiers in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), (Ft. Leavenworth KS, July 1994), II-16.

55. Operation Restore Hope. A Communications and Intelligence Assessment, 5-22.

56. Operation Uphold Democracy. An Assessment of Intelligence and Communications Systems and Networks, 4-67.

57. CMTT Trends Compendium - SASO, 52.

58. Operation Uphold Democracy. An Assessment of Intelligence and Communications Systems and Networks, 5-13.

59. Operation Restore Hope. A Communications and Intelligence Assessment, 6-7.

60. Advanced Military Intelligence Officer Training Slides - Appendix 1, slide 3.

61. Ibid, slide 3.

62. MIOAC battalion commander and author email exchanges - Appendix 2, page 3, “Twelve case studies per class: students choose the topic, which are validated by the instructor”.

63. Ibid, page 2, “...the 15 international officers we have in each OAC...make presentations...it is great for OAC students to hear how others do their operations...emphasizes the fact that there is no real template”.

64. Ibid, page 3, “We add other TTP that aren’t in the FM...I think our ECOA sketches...are much better than the FMs traditional description”.

65. Appendix 1, slide 9. This slide shows that during the SASO block of instruction students produce a situation, event, and decision support template, population and key facility overlays, link and connectivity diagrams and a case study.

66. Appendix 2, page 3. “The brigade operation scenario has a JTF deploying to the country to provide advice and assistance to the HN engaged in a counter-insurgency operation. A division HQ is both the JTF HQ nucleus and the ARFOR. The JTF also has a JSOTF, which is the JTF main effort...The ARFOR’s mission is to secure the key sites that allow the HN forces to concentrate on the counter-insurgency...to the students it is a stability operation securing the airfield and local town. Terrorist groups operate in the town, guerrilla forces operate in the mountains”.

67. Ibid, page 3, “Within the next few months we will actually produce a country study of this fictional country”.

68. Ibid, page 4, “[We conduct a wargame] the old fashioned way: verbally walking through the critical events, action/reaction/counteraction and recording the results”.

69. Appendix 1, slide 6. This slide illustrates the nesting of the ISDC wargame, collection management exercises and ASAS training.

70. Appendix 2, page 2, “[ASAS training] is all HIC, we have made it work in a SASO environment (El Salvador) in the past, but it was too artificial”.

71. Ibid, page 1, “The CM course [at Ft. Huachuca] is a precursor [for a joint CM course]. The Army doctrine for CM is slightly different from joint doctrine...Joint [doesn't emphasize] dissemination as heavily as the Army, and their organization is different too. Our key instructor is in DC attending a DIA CM course to ensure we are in synch”

72. During the authors visit to Ft. Huachuca from 26-28 January 1999 LTC Trautman explained the strategy for addressing PVOs and NGOs in response to the authors question.

73. Appendix 1, slide 5. Identifies each of the referenced as knowledge and then defines the expectation of knowledge within the context of the course.

74. Appendix 2, page 1. Further delineates those tasks as skills or knowledge that are not clearly defined in slide 5 appendix 1.

75. Explained to the author by LTC Trautman during January 1999 visit.

76. Ibid.

77. Appendix 2, page 3, “All of the classroom time, which is about 20% of the course is lecture”.

78. Ibid, page 3, “The real center of gravity of the school are the squad advisors. They are hand selected and validated before they begin their duties. We were using LTCs from throughout the school. Many, many problems associated with them. First, none of them dove into the scenarios and really understood them. The students, who work for days on end could and did BS the LTCs. This doesn't happen now. The squad advisors are intimately familiar with the scenario. Second the advisors are immersed in doctrine and know it better than any LTCs on Huachuca. Third [in the past] some of the LTCs were forced to cancel briefings minutes before they were to begin if their real bosses demanded something else. All in all switching to majors is the best thing I did in OAC”.

79. Ibid, slide 7. this slide describes the TRADOC core curriculum.

80. Ibid, slide 4. This slides demonstrates that both the TRADOC core curriculum and SASO training portion of OAC are ten days long.

81. Appendix 1, page2, “[The CAPSTONE exercise] is a NK scenario. We have embedded some SASO...but it is really more of a rear battle than true LIC...many, many of our grads go to 2ID right after OAC”.
82. Based on authors experience during 1st Cavalry Division BCTP warfighter seminar January 1998 at Fort Leavenworth Kansas.
83. During the authors visit to Fort Huachuca in January 1999 several SASO vignettes used in training were depicted in detail, to include the background information associated with each vignette. For details of these vignettes readers are referred to the MIOAC Brigade O&I training scenario available from Ft Huachuca MIOAC.
84. Don Oberforfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley), 409.
85. This strategy was described during authors vist to Fort Huachuca January of 1999.
86. Told to the author privately by several students during January 1999 visit.
87. Author witnessed a portion of this brief and interviewed student briefer during January 1999 visit.
88. Appendix 1, slide 4. This slide describes the coach, mentor, trainer relationship of the squad advisor and the student.

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